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2 Demography and domination
in Southeast Asia
Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig
All ﬁgures are relative: none more so than those concerning imperial forces. It is
useless knowing about this battle, or that colonial army, unless we know not only
the numbers of Europeans and their allies on one side, but also the number and
quality of their adversaries. It is equally futile playing with ﬁgures for armies, if
we are not told about the populations they policed and protected. This presents
a formidable challenge, one exacerbated for places and periods where numbers
change at dizzying speed, such as modern Southeast Asia. How many readers
know the population for Indonesia – the former Netherlands East Indies – for
1800, 1900 and 1941? How many know the population for the Philippines on
these same dates?
This chapter tackles this demographic and comparative deﬁcit by giving a
broad background to Southeast Asian populations, and to colonial and imperial
forces in Southeast Asia, with a focus on the period 1800–2000. No doubt the
level of sophistication would scandalise a statistician. But the broad brush picture
will be sound, and that is the one that interests us.
How can we go about the Herculean task of sketching in a framework for the
demography of domination? One way is to take slices of history. In 1900, for
instance – roughly the middle of our core date range – the population of South-
east Asia was between 80 and 85 million, with almost 30 million or one-third of
that on Java. At that time, Europe’s population – even taking all Europe bar
Russia into account, rather than just the western portion most prone to overseas
imperialism – was around 300 million. In the words of Charles Hirschman,
‘Although there were a number of very large cities in the region and densely
settled rice-growing areas in Java, the Red River Delta [of North Vietnam], and
a few other areas, most of mainland and insular Southeast Asia remained a
sparsely settled frontier region in 1900.’
1 In 1910 the large cities Hirschman
alludes to – all but two of which were also coastal trading ports – included eleven
over 100,000, namely: Mandalay and Rangoon in Burma; the Siamese capital of
Bangkok; Hanoi and Saigon in Vietnam; Georgetown (Penang) and Singapore
in the Straits Settlements, Batavia (Jakarta), Surakarta and Surabaya in the
Dutch East Indies; and Manila in the Philippines.
2
The most densely populated regions outside of these cities included the rich,
volcanic soils of Java and the rice-producing plains of Luzon in the Philippines,
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as well as the equally intense rice-cultivating river deltas of Lower Burma, and of
the Mekong and Red River deltas in Vietnam. Most of maritime Southeast Asia
was, by contrast, sparsely settled. It was characterised by myriad islands, creeks
and mangroves, with forests, mountains and valleys making land communication
laborious. Movement by sea and river was a good deal more practical than by
land throughout the Malayan peninsula, Indonesia and the Philippines at least
until 1900, and in many places for decades after.
For imperial powers this combination of topography and demography had a
number of implications. It meant that it was relatively easy for a power with
technical superiority at sea to overawe and seize key ports and cities, so establish-
ing trading ports and nominal sovereignty over the fertile areas immediately
adjacent to these. This is what the Portuguese and then Spanish and Dutch did
from the ﬁfteenth to the eighteenth centuries.
The use of ﬁrearms by local rulers was always less pervasive in maritime
Southeast Asia than to the north, and in this earlier period a combination of
European capital, effectiveness in using their own ﬁrepower and ability in fort-
building stood them in good stead. The European innovation of ﬁxing rows of
guns, later cannon, on the decks of their ships from the ﬁfteenth century allowed
them to bombard enemy ships and ports from distance. This gave them the
advantage over Mediterranean and Indian Ocean opponents who operated by
ramming, boarding or with no or few guns.
3 They were thus able to retreat
behind sea walls – the typical seventeenth-century Dutch ship outgunned its
local rival by 28 cannon to two – and town walls such as those at Melaka. These
towns’ sturdily built walls featured bastions, which allowed their massed ﬁrepower
to be brought to bear along the perimeter.
4 As late as 1825–30, the building of
a network of small fortiﬁed posts was to prove crucial to suppressing Prince
Diponegoro’s revolt against the Dutch – the last great revolt in Java.
5 Local
rulers may sometimes have hoped that they lost little if they retreated with their
men, treasure, ships and trade contacts intact, leaving Europeans the form rather
than the substance of an entrepôt. The decades were to prove this a fateful
miscalculation.
Fuelled by increasing international trade, these bastions – Batavia in particular
grew in numbers from 8000 in 1642 to 130,000 in 1670 – galloped from strength
to strength. From them Europeans could use the monopoly proﬁts from spice
and other international trade to buy alliances, deploy small numbers of their
own troops and auxiliaries alongside allies and play politics. For instance, when
the Dutch VOC (the United East Indies Company, or Verenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie) joined Mataram’s Sultan Pakubuwono I against another Javanese
potentate in 1706, the Sultan supplied 10,000 men. By contrast, the VOC supplied
930 Europeans and 2500 ‘Indonesians’.
6 Despite the Dutch gradually gaining
the upper hand in their relationships with such Javanese rulers, these limited
numbers, both of men and of shipping relative to the Indies’ vast coastline,
restricted the extent of their inland dominion well into the nineteenth century.
Up to the early nineteenth century, for most Europeans, Southeast Asia
thus remained a place viewed mainly from the prows of ships and the walls of
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Table 2.1 Warship tonnage of select powers, 1880–1914
1880 1900 1914
Britain 650,000 1,065,000 2,714,000
France 271,000 499,000 900,000
USA 169,000 333,000 985,000
Japan 15,000 187,000 700,000
Source: adapted from Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conﬂict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1988), p. 261.
fortress-ports. Even their maritime power had to be concentrated against key
targets. This allowed Southeast Asians to continue to contest localities and rivers,
and to move freely across borders that existed more on maps than in reality, as
in central Borneo.
7
In this respect we should note that industrialisation and the advent of the
steamship transformed the degree of European naval supremacy in the nine-
teenth century, making direct rule outside of deltas and the immediate environs
of port cities more practical. This can be seen when we compare the tonnage of
three of the main imperial powers with that of the most developed Asian nation:
Japan (Table 2.1).
China lagged further behind, with armoured wooden junks in 1840, when
Europe was introducing the ﬁrst all-metal steamships. Put another way, it has
been estimated that in the nineteenth century China’s share of world manufac-
turing output slumped from nearly 33 per cent in 1800 to 6.2 per cent in 1900,
while the United Kingdom’s soared from 4.3 to over 20 per cent in its peak years
in the early 1880s. Furthermore, the sheer pace of development meant that non-
European countries were constantly playing ‘catch-up’ in military technology
when they did pursue modernisation. Even Table 2.2 does not give a full picture.
Three factors combined to intensify the effect of this European lead.
Table 2.2 Relative shares of world manufacturing output, 1750–1900
1750 1800 1860 1900
Europe 23.2 28.1 53.2 62.0
UK 1.9 4.3 19.9 18.5
France 4.0 4.2 7.9 6.8
Russia 5.0 5.6 7.0 8.8
USA 0.1 0.8 7.2 23.6
Japan 3.8 3.5 2.6 2.4
China 32.8 33.3 19.7 6.2
India 24.5 19.7 8.6 1.7
Source: adapted from Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conﬂict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1988), p. 190.
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First, European countries’ manufacturing was even more impressive on a per
capita basis, and so in terms of spare capital for investment and innovation,
given much smaller populations than the likes of India and China. Per capita
industrialisation of the ‘Third World’ may have been about equal to the West in
1750, but only about one-eighteenth by 1900, and one-ﬁftieth of the level of the
United Kingdom.
8
Second, this fed into accelerating technical improvements. By 1870 France’s
share of manufacturing output was still modest, but its ships and repeating riﬂes
were among the best. Germany, whose share of world manufacturing output was
still smaller in 1860 at 4.9 per cent, already possessed excellent breech-loading
rather than muzzle-loading ﬁeld artillery, and one of the best drilled and techni-
cally most competent armies. In the 1890s the Europeans added the Maxim gun.
Together with efﬁciently used artillery and the best riﬂes and bullets, this helped
to turn the 1898 battle of Omdurman, in the Sudan, into a massacre. Thousands
of Sudanese tribesmen were mown down for a total of fewer than ﬁfty British
and Egyptian deaths. Just as China struggled to chase early nineteenth-century
improvements in muzzle-loading guns (trigger-ﬁring rather than the unreliable
wick-ﬁred  ﬂintlocks still used in the Opium War of 1839–42), Europe was
moving from the 1870s to 1900 to another level of mobile, breech-loading ﬁeld
artillery and Maxim guns.
9
Third, technical superiority was compounded, from the eighteenth century
onwards, by organisational superiority. The early corruption in overseas compa-
nies gradually gave way to bureaucratic and ﬁscal discipline and standardised
procedures. This in turn underpinned the raising of larger forces of well and
uniformly equipped, intensely drilled, standing armies, including larger ‘colonial
forces’, whose local troops increasingly served not under their own leaders, but
directly under European ofﬁcers. None of this made Europeans invulnerable,
but the cumulative progress did make resistance increasingly costly, and Europe-
ans increasingly willing to intervene. The British expansion in India from the
mid-eighteenth century to the ‘Mutiny’ of 1857–8, an expansion that included
the conquest of all of Burma’s coastline, was witness to this changing calculus.
10
Another way of viewing this is in terms of the economic sinews of imperial
power, especially the export products that were to underpin the expansion of
colonial states, police forces and armies. Between the sixteenth and early eight-
eenth centuries this was reliant mainly on the spice trade, especially as concen-
trated on a few islands in the Moluccas (in modern eastern Indonesia, now
known as Maluku) and a few ports spread around the region, as well as on taxes
on a few key items. The latter notably featured the opium farm that provided
upwards of 40 per cent of the revenue of the British-controlled Straits Settle-
ments throughout the nineteenth century, and a not inconsiderable fraction of
revenue in British India, Java, French Indochina and elsewhere.
The Spanish in the Philippines added sugar production to these economic
underpinnings, and the Dutch coffee as well as sugar when they moved into
inland Java. The latter expansion was achieved while keeping the native aristo-
cracy as a ruling layer just below a very few Dutch for most of the interior, while
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using this relationship to extract tribute or deliveries of Javanese sugar and
coffee. But while control of international trade easily funded maritime supremacy,
it still did not fund large land forces. Even the development of Java, combined
with a relatively cheap style of indirect rule, was insufﬁcient to ﬁnance itself. The
Dutch United East Indies Company or VOC was bankrupted, and handed its
territories over to the Dutch government in 1799.
A further illustration of the uneven nature of European dominance in the
eighteenth century can be found in Dutch-VOC relations with Malay States of
Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula. The Dutch seized Melaka (Malacca) from
the Portuguese in 1641, and easily held this fort, as they did those around the
Dutch Indies.
Melaka served as a watch-post in the Strait of Melaka as well as a collecting
centre for tin, a highly valuable commodity for trade in Europe. The VOC tried
to monopolise the supply of tin, to the chagrin of Malay rulers. This tension
reached a climax in the 1780s, when other Europeans, notably the English
country traders, tried to undermine the Dutch monopoly with the tacit under-
standing of some Malay rulers. Renowned Bugis warrior Raja Haji of Riau tried
to form a common front against the Dutch and very nearly succeeded in 1784.
His efforts were thwarted by the arrival of a naval ﬂeet led by Admiral Peter van
Braam, representing the deployment not simply of company strength, as before,
but of the military might of the Netherlands ﬂeet itself. Admiral Braam lifted
Raja Haji’s blockade of Melaka, expelled the Bugis from Riau and Selangor, and
imposed a degree of control over both states, thus marking the beginning of the
process of imperial control over the Malay Peninsula.
11
Events in Selangor in 1784 show that the intervention of the metropolitan
ﬂeet, while sufﬁcient to boost maritime supremacy, still did not guarantee dura-
bility on land.
12 Working with the Siak Sultanate from Sumatra (typically, local
leaders viewed the Dutch as a valuable ally in their own disputes), van Braam’s
ﬂeet of six Dutch Navy warships outgunned the Selangor forces in 1784, seizing
coastal Kuala Selangor. They duly installed a Siak prince there, backed by a
small Dutch garrison.
But what naval power and local alliance quickly secured, minimal land power
soon lost. The Dutch just did not have large enough colonial forces to garrison
signiﬁcant numbers of outposts strongly and consistently. Selangor’s Sultan
Ibrahim (reigned 1782–1826) drove out the small garrison in June 1785. The
Dutch then resorted to the more subtle device of a naval blockade, which
secured a July 1786 treaty. Selangor admitted vassal status and promised to sell
its tin to the Dutch, but under its original sultan. For most purposes he was left
independent. Indeed, he had almost as much to worry about from Thai claims
to overlordship in the Malayan peninsula as from Dutch.
13
This awkward balance of naval and logistical supremacy, but more tenuous
dominance on terra ﬁrma, persisted until at least the mid-nineteenth century. As
late as May 1848, a Dutch expedition could easily use naval power to land on
Bali, complete with an army of 2400 (one-third of these being European). Again,
naval supremacy was followed by initial defeat on land, at the hands of a local
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army of 16,000 (1500 with ﬁrearms). The ratio of dead favoured the Dutch
forces ten to one (200 to 2000), but to no avail. As with Selangor, though, Dutch
supremacy in ships and overall resources allowed them to force a ﬁnal treaty,
with the Balinese recognising Dutch overlordship in external affairs, but retain-
ing internal autonomy. Contrast this to the events of 1904, sixty years and
several expeditions later: expeditions that had, as yet, failed to ﬁnalise Dutch
supremacy over all of the island’s disunited kingdoms.
On 14 September 1904 a Dutch force advanced on Bali’s Denpasar to extract
compensation for the pillage of a shipwreck. The Raja led his followers out.
Soldiers, ofﬁcials, wives and children, dressed in ritual white, with ﬂowers in
their hair, lined up in full view of the Dutch forces. A priest thrust his dagger
into the Raja’s chest, whereupon his followers turned their knives on each other.
Spurred on by shots, the Dutch further raked the crowd with riﬂe and artillery
ﬁre, leaving a mountain of corpses. This was Balinese puputan (ending). Around
1100 Balinese chose death this way in 1906–8 alone. By the latter date, Dutch
control was complete. Whatever mix of magic, honour and despair drove these
acts – which against indigenous rivals may have constituted last efforts to wrest
victory – they were powerful recognitions of a changed reality: traditional poli-
ties could no longer compete.
14
Again, nineteenth-century European industrialisation was vital in effecting this
change. It provided the pull of potential markets, and the push of extra Euro-
pean ships and traders, which were crucial to the development of a new, more
pervasive imperialism. Before 1850, areas such as Sumatra, the Malay states and
Indochina contributed relatively little to world trade, though much to regional.
Then plantations and mines spread rapidly, with vast population movements
such as that of the Chinese and Indians into Malaya underpinning this. In the
Netherlands Indies alone the transformation was startling. There was a transi-
tion, from the 1860s to early 1900s, away from a ‘Cultivation System’ (Kultuurstelsel),
based on the forced delivery of export commodities by peasants, to a liberal
system of freer trade and production. This was accompanied by a vast expansion
in infrastructure.
By 1900 revenue bases were enlarged and more varied, and mass production
and export of high compass goods – tin, rubber, rice, as well as the older staples
such as coffee and sugar in the Indies – were the rule. In Java, there were 35
kilometres of railway in 1869. By the 1890s most sizeable towns were connected.
In the 1890s the newly formed KPM (Royal Dutch Steamship Company) mas-
sively expanded inter-island operations. The merchant ﬂeet registered with the
Netherlands East Indies multiplied sevenfold between 1870 and 1930, from 880
to 6253 vessels, while exports grew ﬁfteenfold.
15 Advances in technology, includ-
ing in the ﬁeld of tropical medicine, robust organisation and the ﬁnancial muscle
necessary to maintain and deploy larger colonial armies, including a majority of
locally raised but European equipped, drilled and led forces, were to be vital to
‘new imperialism’.
16
Between 1850 and 1914, when the European powers expanded inland, South-
east Asia underwent a transformation. By 1914 it dominated relatively new
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Table 2.3
Southeast Asian primary production, 1937
–1940, in metric tonnes
British Malaya
British Burma
French
Netherlands
American
Thailand
Total
Percentage of
and Borneo
Indochina
East Indies
Philippines
(independent)
world production
or exports
Abaca
1.2
––
–
183
–
184.2
95.6
Cinchona
––
–
10.4
––
10.4
80
Coffee
––
1.5
62.4
3
–
66.9
7
Maize
––
565
2,037
427
7
3,036
80
Coconut products
116
–
10
506
54
–
686
73
Palm oil
46
––
238
––
238
47.6
Pepper
––
–
20
––
20
70
Petroleum
1,000
––
7,400
––
9,400
4.5
Rice
324
4,940
3,945
4,007
2,179
1,771
17,165
98
Rubber
501
8
6
1
432
–
8
1,040
85.2
Sugar
–
39
43
547
1,076
19
1,724
21
Teak (m
3
)
–
475
–
400
–
189
1,064
95
Tin
77
2
1.6
40
–
13.4
134
65
Source: adapted from Chris Dixon, 
South East Asia in the World Economy
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 110.
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world markets, such as those for rubber, as well as old ones it had previously had
a more restricted regional impact on, such as tin.
Perhaps the best symbol of this dual acceleration in European economic pen-
etration and related technical innovation, and the way these began to transform
colonial security regimes, is the steamship. Sailing ships continued to dominate
trade until the latter years of the nineteenth century, but steam power was
increasingly important from its appearance in Southeast Asian waters. The spread
of steamships was to play a vital role in stemming piracy from the late 1830s to
the 1870s, especially with English and Spanish destruction of communities sup-
porting piracy in the Sulu archipelago and surrounding islands between the
Philippines and Borneo.
The expansion of international trade in the late eighteenth century, especially
opium going to China and tea from it, had created increased opportunities for
piracy. The simultaneous European undermining of strong local regimes, which
formerly controlled or co-opted sea-going communities, further increased the
danger. Many Bugis, following defeat by the Dutch on Sulawesi, turned to
piracy. The Sulu (Jolo) Islands, which lie between the Philippines and Borneo,
also found a growing China market for their jungle and maritime produce –
notably sea slugs and birds’ nests – and took to raiding for slaves to collect it.
With the Sulu area falling on the fracture line between British, Spanish and
Dutch empires, European action was limited. The ‘Iranun’ or Lanun pirate
ﬂeets grew. People as far apart as the Visayas in the central Philippines and
Singapore feared the winds that brought annual raiding ﬂeets.
As with the Dutch in Selangor, Europeans initially found that their naval
supremacy had limitations. European navies were foiled by the local ﬂeets’ abil-
ity to row against the wind and up shallow creeks, and by the relatively small
number of European ships available. But between the late 1820s and 1840s
steamers began to pursue ‘pirate’ perahu – long, low-lying craft with sails, oars-
men and shallow drafts – against the wind or up shallow creeks, before blowing
them out of the water with superior guns. Gradually the era of large raiding ﬂeets
of up to a hundred or more perahu gave way to one of smaller raiding parties.
Technology and overwhelming destructive intent allowed colonial navies, and
the English adventurer James Brooke in Borneo from the 1840s, to destroy boats
and villages alike. For instance, Tempasuk and Maradu were devastated in
1845, and the Spanish descended upon Balangingi, in the southern Philippine
Islands, the same year.
17
The year 1845 was in some respects pivotal. Three Spanish war steamers or
kapal api (‘ﬁre boats’, recently purchased from the British), a coterie of smaller
vessels, Marina Sutil,
18 and locally raised Zamboangas auxiliaries, assisted by artil-
lery, stormed the kota or walled fortiﬁcation of Balangingi in the southwestern
Sulu archipelago. Some 450 Balangingi were killed, forts were raised, seven
villages and 150 vessels were destroyed, coconut trees were felled and more men
were exiled over the following years. More steamers followed. Eighteen arrived
in crates in 1860 alone. The imperial problem was increasingly one of British
ships based at Labuan, Borneo, Dutch ships based on the East Coast of Borneo
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and Spanish ships from Luzon and the Visayas countering smaller pirate attacks
around Borneo’s myriad creeks. By the 1870s Spanish tactics of sinking anything
even vaguely classiﬁable as a potential pirate made even legitimate indigenous
trade difﬁcult in the seas around Sulu.
Nowhere is the impact of technology better symbolised than in the efﬁcacy of
the steamships Diana and Nemesis. The Diana was one of three East India Com-
pany steamships sent to Burma in the 1824–6 war. Burma’s King Bagyidaw,
overconﬁdent following his kingdom’s wave of expansion, had sought to solve
border problems with British India’s Assam by war. The Company despatched
40,000 troops to Rangoon, where ‘General Disease’ soon took the greater part of
15,000 casualties. It took the sending of three steamships to transform the situ-
ation. According to Headrick one of these, the Diana,
towed sailing ships into position, transported troops, and bombarded
Burmese fortiﬁcations with her swivel guns and Congreve rockets. The
most important function of the Diana was to capture Burmese praus, or
warboats . . . By February 1826 the Diana, which the Burmese called the
‘ﬁre devil’, had pushed with the British ﬂeet up to Amarapura, over 400
miles upriver. The King of Burma, seeing his capital [at Ava] threatened,
sued for peace.
19
The King must have been very impressed indeed, since the subsequent Treaty
of Yandibaw ceded Manipur, Arakan and Tenasserim, shearing off most of
Burma’s coastline.
While the Diana helped to intimidate Burma in the 1820s, the British steam-
ship Nemesis made China’s nineteenth-century junks look like relics when it faced
them in the Opium War of 1839–42.
20 Built in 1839, this 700 ton, 184 foot long,
29 foot wide vessel featured all-metal design and compartments, and being
ﬂat-bottomed drew as little as four and a half feet of water. Going upriver to
Guangzhou (Canton) in March 1841 ‘she practically slithered along the muddy
river bed’. Yet despite the shallow draught, which enabled it to project oceanic
power up-river, it was still twice the size of a Chinese junk. Here was a vessel
that could power ahead regardless of wind, in both rough ocean and shallow
river. Furthermore, the European adoption of riﬂed guns in the eighteenth cen-
tury, with their greater accuracy and range, meant its two 32-pound guns and
ﬁve 6-pounders, ﬁring shell and grapeshot, made mincemeat of wooden Chinese
forts and junks, which still featured small cannons. Worse still, the junks’ guns
had limited scope for aiming, short of moving the entire vessel.
Even the ordinary infantryman gained during the campaign, as ﬂintlock mus-
kets were replaced with percussion ﬁred weapons, secure against the damp,
while they also beneﬁted from the support of ﬁeld artillery. Though most
European vessels were still sailing warships, the Nemesis symbolised a widening
technological gap, and foreshadowed the European and American gunboats that
were to support Western privileges in China’s Treaty Ports up to the Second
World War.
21
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More prosaically, from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, the
relief of troops between Europe and Southeast Asia might have taken two years
or longer for a return journey. The advent of the steamship, the opening of the
Suez Canal in 1869 and new modes of communication (notably sea-laid cable
from the 1870s) changed this. Now reinforcements might be asked for and sent
in months, and in increasing numbers. In the past, the Spanish or the Dutch
could send but a few dozen armed men on each ship, paling to insigniﬁcance
in comparison with Ming Chinese battleships of the early 1400s. By contrast
the French could assemble more than 40,000 troops after news reached Paris
that Captain Rivière’s men in Hanoi were about to be overrun by Vietnamese
soldiers and Black Flag mercenary Chinese forces in 1882–3. Reinforcements
arrived too late to save Rivière’s head, which was taken by the dreaded Black
Flags during an imprudent sortie, but were able to relieve the citadel and use it
as a launchpad for the conquest of northern Vietnam.
Nor were increased ﬁrepower, manoeuvrability, upriver penetration and speed
of reinforcement the only gains from steampower. Reduced shipping times in
larger vessels ensured troops would arrive in a better state of health.
22 Colonial
forces still had to operate in what were, to them, alien territories, battling climate
and disease as well as unconventional styles of warfare and unforgiving terrain.
But they stood an ever increasing chance of arriving in good shape, of adequate
supply, of reinforcement and, in extremis, of evacuation.
Many Southeast Asian rulers grasped that the increasing numbers and arma-
ment of colonial forces had changed the parameters of power. Some took an
interest in new technologies. Vietnam possessed at least four steamers by the
1830s and Vietnam’s last independent Emperor, Tu Duc, acquired four more
between 1865 and 1872.
23 However, the Vietnamese, like the Siamese, Burmese
and Chinese, were not able to produce up-to-date steamships in large numbers
on their own. A ﬁrst Vietnamese attempt in 1838 to build a steamship based
upon a purchased Western model failed when the engine exploded. A second
attempt in 1840 was successful. Even then, imitation implied constantly lagging
behind. No Southeast Asian court could compete with Europe’s rate and scale of
industrialisation, and depth of knowledge on the operation of the very latest
technologies. Hence none could expect parity on the battleﬁeld. It was to take
the development of a Maoist style of guerrilla warfare, combined with modern
weapons left over from the Paciﬁc War, and afterwards supplied by the Soviet
Union and China, to rebalance the scales from the 1940s.
That is getting ahead of our story, which is currently situated in the nine-
teenth century. At that point the advent of the steamship, new types of riﬂe
and other armaments and improvements gave Europeans the initiative. The
availability of quinine also reduced the deadliness of malaria, and the accumula-
tion of knowledge about tropical conditions made troops more efﬁcient. But big
problems remained.
First, the sheer number of islands in maritime Southeast Asia – about 7100 for
the Philippines and more than 13,000 (3000 inhabited) for Indonesia – made the
development of further maritime sinews, beyond the handful of ships sufﬁcient
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for dominating key ports and islands before 1850, vital if domination was to
become pervasive.
24 This more numerous presence had to await the late nine-
teenth century, following additional industrialisation in Europe, and the time
required for its ripple effect to roll several thousand miles across the globe, and
penetrate even to the recesses and rivers of Southeast Asia.
Second, once an imperial power moved inland it often faced the fracturing of
territories into river valleys, forest and mountain. This meant there was always
the potential for Southeast Asians to resort to guerrilla tactics. This remained as
true in post-Second World War Vietnam as it was in the forty-year long Aceh
Wars (1873–1913) and in Filipino opposition to American suppression of their
independence (1898 to 1901). It was especially true in less developed regions
such as the Burmese highlands and the cordillera in northern Luzon. Here
imperialists sometimes resorted to separating highland from lowland rule (the
Burmese highlands being a classic case, as well as the northern Luzon cordillera),
and working through local rulers in the former.
25 Even the United States initially
resorted to enlisting the help of local Muslim chiefs or datus in the Muslim-
dominated island of Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, before gradually
taking more direct control.
Postcolonial states have tended to experience problems policing these same
areas, in part due to differing topographies and identities there, in part due to
the legacy of their separate administration under imperial regimes, and in some
cases (notably Burma) due to an additional imperial preference for recruiting
these minorities as colonial forces.
Population densities hence mattered and, to return to our opening theme of
demographics, Europe faced in Southeast Asia an area that was not only techni-
cally less advanced, but also relatively sparsely populated. By contrast to South-
east Asia’s 80–85 million people, Europe in 1900, with its 300 million for an area
not dissimilar in size, boasted three to four times the population. Britain, France
and Germany all had populations of over 40 million. Ironically, however, the
Netherlands  – the European power overseeing Java’s 1900 population of
29 million people (one of the densest in Southeast Asia) – had a population of
just ﬁve million. All this is without reckoning on the United States, which in
December 1898 purchased from Spain the title to the Philippines, with its 7000
plus islands supporting a meagre seven million people.
What was true of 1800 or even 1900 was, however, becoming far less true by
1941. The populations of Europe and Southeast Asia grew at very different
rates. When Hirschman wrote in 1994, he could say that:
From a demographic base less than one-third that of European in 1900,
Southeast Asia will have a population larger than Europe’s in the year 2000.
Europe’s population will have expanded by about 60 per cent over the
century while Southeast Asia’s population has grown more than sixfold. In
the year 2000, the largest European country of Germany will have about 83
million people compared to the largest Southeast Asian country of Indone-
sia which will have a population of almost 218 million. Vietnam, Thailand
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and the Philippines will each be considerably more populous than the major
European countries of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
26
Putting all this together, we can tabulate the rough populations of Southeast
Asian countries for 1900, the 1940s high-water mark of European imperialism,
the 1980s and today, thus giving both snapshots of the region, and a sense of the
breathless rate of change. For the sake of comparison, we provide two tables, the
ﬁrst (Table 2.4) covering Asia, the second (Table 2.5) covering those imperial
powers that had a major role in Southeast Asia. For Europe as a whole, ﬁgures
corresponding to the 15 countries that made up the 1995–2003 European Union
seem more relevant, if not ﬁgures for the main few colonising powers of Britain,
France, the Netherlands and Portugal. Either way, these involve narrower deﬁni-
tions of Europe than that used by Hirschman and hence smaller ﬁgures for
Europe’s population.
Nevertheless, the two tables conﬁrm the relative underpopulation of pre-
nineteenth and nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. Added to that, Reid has
concluded that prior to 1800 Southeast Asian population growth rates were
low.
27 These ﬁgures also conﬁrm that Europe leaped ahead in terms of popula-
tion in the nineteenth century. Most of the rest of the world enjoyed a similar
phenomenon later, in the twentieth century, just as Europe’s growth slowed.
The result was that the challenge of Europeans ruling Southeast Asians, and
Asians in general, became greater in demographic terms as the twentieth
century wore on. This challenge was further compounded by the growth of
a new European-educated generation of anti-colonialists after 1914, who could
voice their grievances in the language of the colonising power, and adapt
modern methods of political organisation to ferment strikes, riots and coup
attempts.
Another way of looking at the ﬁgures is to focus on the greatest imperial
systems of power that have impacted on the region. Perhaps the greatest in
overall scope and power were the Chinese (here meaning the Ming dynasty in
its ﬁfteenth-century ventures) and the modern British and Japanese. We will look
at these ﬁrst, and then the smaller scale French and Dutch afterwards for com-
parison. Portugal and Spain, among the greatest imperial powers in the sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries, merit comparatively little mention, since by the late
nineteenth century they were minor players: Portugal being reduced to the tiny
possession of East Timor; Spain being replaced by the United States in the
Philippines in 1898. First, it is as well to get a sense of the overall changes in the
world’s population so that, again, ﬁgures such as ‘10,000 crack troops’ (the
number of soldiers on a Ming Chinese ﬂeet sailing Southeast Asian waters in
1407) make more sense (Table 2.6).
It goes without saying that China outstrips Southeast Asia in demographic
terms, and that this was even more the case before 1900. In 1400, when the
Ming Chinese empire was on the cusp of expanding further into Yunnan, and
for a while into present-day Vietnam, the world population was between 400
and 500 million. Of these about 60 million were in Europe, and 75 million in
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Table 2.4
Southeast Asia and comparative population 
ﬁgures for 180
0
–2000
a
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Burma (Myanmar)
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaya (1800
–1963),
Malaysia
(1963
–
2004)
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
c.1940
146 m
40,657 (1947)
16.12 m (1939)
See Vietnam
69.43 m (1939)
See Vietnam
4.74 m (1941)
16.36 m (1940)
769,216 (1941)
14.46 m (1937)
c.1900
80
–85 m
18,000
–
20,000
10.5 m
1.7 m (early 1900s)
40 m (
c
.29 m Java,
11 m Outer Islands)
0.6
–
0.8 m (early
1900s estimate for
just Laos)
2.4 m (1911)
d
7.6 m (1903)
226,842 (1901)
8.3 m (1911)
c.1800
b
33 m
–
4.6 m
<
 1 m (1860s)
5
–10 m (
Java 
ﬁgures
for 1800 and 1845)
c
1.2 m (1800 incl.
northeast Thailand)
0.5 m (1800) to
0.75 m mid-century,
Pattani included
2 m (1800) of whom
0.23 m Mindanao
and Sulu
c
.1000 (1819)
2.8 m
c.1980
350 m
192,832
29 m (1973)
5.8 m (1963)
146.93 m (1980)
3 m (1985)
13.43 m (1980,
now including
Borneo States)
48 m (1980)
2.41 m (1980)
45 m (1980)
2000
524 m
339,000
48.78 m
12.23 m
212 m
5.4 m
23.17 m
75.96 m
4.01 m
e
 (3.26 m
resident)
62.32 m
CAIC02 10/10/05, 10:13 AM 5152 Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig
Table 2.4
(cont
’
d
)
c.1800
b
c.1900
c.1940
c.1980
2000
East Timor/Timor
Leste
f
Vietnam
India
China
a
 Million indicated by 
‘m’. There were considerably more Southeast Asian polities in 1800 than this list of those that survived into the twenty-
ﬁrst century. Most 1900
ﬁgures from Charles Hirschman,  ‘Population and Society in Twentieth-century Southeast Asia ’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25, 2 (1994), pp. 381
–
406. Figures for
Southeast Asia 2000 from UN ESCAP, 
Population and Development Indicators
: www.enescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/data_sheet/2000/index.asp (2000).
Southeast Asia 1940  ﬁgures from Peter Duus,  ‘Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues ’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Meyers and Mark Peattie (eds), 
The Japanese
Wartime Empire, 1931
–1945 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. xiii. World and Europe estimates (de
ﬁned as the 199
5
–2003 EU 15, excluding Eastern
Europe) 1980 from Of
ﬁce of National Statistics (UK), 
Population Trends
, 115 (Spring 2004), p. 37, www.statistics.gov.uk. Japan, USA, China and India pre-1981 from
census reports as compiled in www.geohive.com.
b
 For pre-1800 Southeast Asia, mostly see Anthony Reid, 
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce
, Vol. I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 14.
c
 Compare Reid (see note b) to Robert Cribb, 
Historical Atlas of Indonesia
 (London: Curzon, 2000), pp. 6
9
–70. Reid’s 
ﬁgures make Java’s population smaller than the
outer islands (3.5 million for Sumatra alone) in 1800.
d
 The Malay States, sovereign though accepting British advice, totalled nearly 1.96 million in 1911, the Straits Settlements (Pe
nang, Malacca as then spelt and
Singapore) adding 714,069. Penang and Malacca only joined a Malayan Union in 1946. For the sake of comparison, 
‘Malaya’ 
ﬁgures include Penang and Malacca
and exclude Singapore.
e
 The last Singapore 
ﬁgure includes 0.75 million non-residents (foreign workers and expatriates). Singapore 
ﬁgures are from Constance Mary Turnbull, 
A History of
Singapore
 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 5; Saw Swee-Hock, 
‘Population Growth and Control
’, in Ernest Chew and Edwin Lee (eds), 
A History of
Singapore
 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 21
9
–
41; Victor Purcell, 
The Chinese in Malaya
 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 296; and
government statistics for 2000.
f
 Portuguese conquest was sixteenth century, Dutch seizure of West Timor 1613. Indonesia occupied East Timor from 1975 to a 1999
 independence vote. Timor-Leste
became independent 20 May 2002.
–
7 m (north and
centre only)
73 m
100 m (Ming),
360 m (1812)
–
13 m (estimate for all
Indochina in 1906)
238.4 m (1901)
368 m (1911)
461,000
23.5 m (1938,
all Indochina)
318.6 m (1941)
582.6 m (1953)
555,350 (1980)
53 m (1979)
675 m (1981)
1008 m (1981)
924,642 (2004)
79.83 m
1002 m
1275 m
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Table 2.5
Population 
ﬁgures for imperial powers in Southeast Asia 180
0
–2000
a
Country
Europe (excluding
Russia, USSR and
successor states)
b
UK, France,
Netherlands
and Portugal
UK
d
France
Netherlands
Portugal
Germany
Japan
USA
a
 Million indicated by 
‘m’. For sources, see also Table 2.4. Most 
ﬁgures for 1900 column from Charles Hirschman, 
‘Population and Society in Twentieth-century
Southeast Asia
’, 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
 25, 2 (1994), pp. 381
–
406. Figures for Southeast Asia 2000 from UN ESCAP, Population and Development Indicators:
www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/data_sheet/2000/index.asp (2000). Southeast Asia 1940 
ﬁgures from Duus, 
‘Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems
and Issues
’, p. xiii. World and Europe estimates (de
ﬁned as the 199
5
–2003 EU 15, excluding Eastern Europe) from 1980 from Of
ﬁce of National Statistics (UK),
Population Trends
, 115 (Spring 2004), p. 37, www.statistics.gov.uk.
b
 For post-1980 Europe 
ﬁgures (deﬁned as the 1995–2003 EU 15) see Of ﬁce of National Statistics (UK), 
Population Trends
, 115 (Spring 2004), p. 37. For pre-1980
Netherlands 
ﬁgures excluding Belgium, see Chris Cook and John Stevenson, 
Modern European History, 176
3
–1985
 (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 21
6
–17.
c
 Brian Graham, 
Modern Europe
 (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 67, for Europe excluding the centre (Poland, Slavic states), Balkans and Russia.
d
 Pre-1980 UK ﬁgures from Chris Cook and Brendan Keith, 
British Historical Facts, 183
0
–1900
 (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 23
2
–3.
e
 Mikiso Hane, 
Modern Japan
 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 53, for  ‘the common people
’.
2000
375 m
143.55 m
58.8 m
58.89 m
15.86 m
10 m
82 m
126.87 m
275.3 m
c.1980
356 m (1981)
134.58 m
56.35 m (1981)
54.18 m (1981)
14.25 m (1981)
9.8 m (1981)
78.4 m (1981)
117.9 m (1981)
228 m (1981)
c.1800
119 m
c
 (1800)
48.3 m (Spain
would add
10.5 m)
15.89 m (1801)
27.4 m
2.1 m
2.9 m
23 m
24.89 m (1792)
e
5.3 m
c.1900
300 m, Hirschman,
all Europe except
Russia
90.5 m
41.45 m
38.5 m
5.1 m
5.4 m
56.4 m
43.8 m (1898)
76.2 m
c.1940
–
50
–
111 m (1950)
48.23 m (1940)
50.61 m (1950)
42.5 m (1950)
9.6 m (1950)
8.4 m (1950)
69.1 m (1950)
71 m
132.16 m
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Table 2.6 Growth of world population
Year Population
5000  5–20 million
0 200 million
1300  400 million
1650 500 million
1700 600 million
1750 700 million
1800 900 million
1850 1.2 billion
1900 1.6 billion
1950 2.4 billion
1975 4 billion
1999 6 billion
a
a United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, www.un.org/
esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbillion.htm
Source: Ralph Tomlinson, Population Dynamics and Consequences of World Demographic Change (New York:
Random House, 1976), p. 18.
China. By comparison, Reid estimates 23 million for Southeast Asia as late as
1600, and 33 million for 1800.
28
Perhaps more importantly, both Europe and China were about to enjoy
population growth spurts, with relatively few years of overwhelming famine,
pestilence or military devastation. China’s population went from about 75 to 100
million, and Europe from about 60 to 80 million, in a ﬁfteenth century that saw
about 100 million added to the world’s population. At a time when many areas
of Southeast Asia were very scantily populated, Ming China could ﬁeld well over
a million troops, albeit most scattered around China’s interior, or needed to
secure its borders.
29 This is also signiﬁcant with regard to Europe. Celebrated
battles such as that of Agincourt in 1415, during which 6000 English defeated
30,000 French, clearly suggest a much smaller scale of forces.
An opposite point about demographics is that, even when Europe was at its
peak as a percentage of world population and its relative technological lead – in
the nineteenth century – many of the European imperial powers were still
tiny compared to their empires. Even the largest, such as France and Britain,
possessed empires far larger than the metropolitan territories, in terms of both
area and population. Britain alone, at its peak, controlled as much as a quarter
of the world’s surface area.
Hence several perennial dilemmas continued to haunt the management
of imperial forces. There were never enough Europeans available to garrison
imperial possessions. They were more susceptible to die of what were to them
exotic diseases than in battle, and the maintenance of supply routes remained a
signiﬁcant problem. Those willing to serve were not always of the character desired
either, as Meixsel’s Chapter 7 notes for the United States in the Philippines. This
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is all the more surprising given the small numbers needed there. In the 1920s
there were about 12,000 troops in the Philippines (around 7000 Philippine
Scouts and 4500 Americans). The latter ﬁgure was the United States’ contri-
bution to the entire Philippine garrison. Even then, most of these troops were
concentrated on the fortress-islands strung like teeth across the entrance to
Manila Bay, and two inland military camps near Manila (Fort McKinley and
Camp Stotsenburg).
30
The British in particular mastered the art of the possible, of controlling mil-
lions with a core of only thousands of white soldiers and administrators, when
conquering British India. That is, they mastered the art of ruling outlying areas
lightly, with District Ofﬁcers able to call mainly on a handful of native police
under European ofﬁcers. They also reﬁned the techniques involved in raising
and managing ‘native’ troops commanded by small numbers of European
ofﬁcers and NCOs.
31 Even after the First World War, the British ran India, with
its 300 million plus people and rising nationalism, with an army of 206,000,
about a third being British (and even fewer English). More shockingly, they
ran Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) backed up by just one battalion of African
troops (800 men commanded by 30 British ofﬁcers and NCOs). In 1914 British
Malaya (roughly the size of England) and the Straits Settlements, with the com-
bined population of the two overtaking three million around the war, were
secured by just two battalions of troops (one British, one Indian), supplemented
by the paramilitary Malay States Guides and volunteer forces.
32
To get a better idea of just how tight the situation could be, consider the
forces available in the Dutch or Netherlands East Indies: present-day Indonesia.
The Netherlands in the seventeenth century had a population of about 1.5
million, reaching 6 million in 1830, before Belgian secession in 1830 scaled it
back to 2.5 million. Yet ﬁve thousand ships sailed from Holland between 1605
and 1795 carrying a million people. Of these a mere one in three returned.
Consequently, other European towns and states supplied most of the soldiers on
VOC ships.
33 It should be no surprise, then, that before 1799 the VOC relied
heavily on alliances with local leaders to bulk out its own forces. This was
sufﬁcient to secure an essentially commercial project by a government-backed
company that was largely limited to the control of trading posts, rather than the
administration of an entire country. Even after the Netherlands govern-
ment took over the Indies, in 1799, and after the Napoleonic Wars were out of
the way, VOC forces comprised just 5500 Europeans and 5000 Indonesians
in 1815.
The Java War of 1825–30 subsequently forced the Dutch to expand their
meagre forces. The Netherlands Indies population was by then already larger
than that of the Netherlands, and would reach 40 million by 1900. This popula-
tion was secured by a colonial army (KNIL: Royal Netherlands Indies Army
or Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger), which increased from about 29,000 in 1861
(including around 14,500 Javanese) to a peak of about 40,000 men (including
18,000 Europeans) in the mid-1890s.
34 By the latter date the colonial government
was in the ﬁnal stages of vastly increasing its territories. Forces then simmered
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down to about 38,000 (including 15,000 Europeans) in 1901.
35 The 1901 ﬁgure
included around 23,000 ‘Indonesians’, among whom 3800 were Ambonese.
By then the Aceh War had had a major impact, at ﬁrst negative and later
positive, on Dutch conﬁdence. In 1871 an Anglo-Dutch treaty had removed
previous British insistence that Aceh – the northernmost state on the island of
Sumatra – remain independent. Notwithstanding British preference for preserv-
ing trade links there, it was better for weak Dutch imperialism to move in, rather
than risk increasingly assertive Americans or others doing so. A force of 8500
troops, half as many servants and coolies again, and 1500 reserves duly took the
Acehnese capital (on a second attempt) in 1874. Then it became bogged down in
guerrilla-style warfare against ﬁghters led by local chiefs, and ulama or religious
leaders. This was a potent brew of ‘nationalism’ – Aceh had a proud history –
and of jihad. The Dutch lost up to 150 men a month to cholera alone, disease
maintaining its just reputation as the most fearsome enemy of colonial armies,
and the Dutch appetite for expansion was dampened.
36
Then in the 1890s KNIL ofﬁcer Van Heutsz (Governor of Aceh 1898–1904,
Governor-General of the Indies 1904–9) mastered the art of using small
forces of Marechaussee. These local troops were organised in groups of ﬁfteen
to eighteen, with European carbines and short native klewang (sword), under a
European ofﬁcer and two NCOs: one European and one ‘Native’. Marechaussee
units, sometimes abandoning strict drill and even shoes for a counter-insurgent
style, combined disciplined ﬁrepower and ﬂexibility and close-quarters effective-
ness amidst alang-alang (elephant grass). Van Heutsz combined their deployment
with the assuagement of local leaders or uleebelang. His tactics, of European-led
but mainly locally raised forces, in ﬂexible columns and backed by light artillery,
was made more potent by the discovery that treating Islam favourably also
undermined opposition.
The Aceh conﬂict simmered down, though it never died out. The Dutch went
on to subdue most of the rest of the outer islands within a decade. Van Heutsz
even penned a standard ‘Short Declaration’ for rulers to sign, replacing their
former obligation merely to recognise Dutch sovereignty in general with a re-
quirement to follow all such general orders as the colonial government should
issue.
37 In addition, by the turn of the century improvements in army conditions
– better clothing, knowledge of medicine, terrain and even how to keep water
fresh longer – were having a cumulative effect.
The Marechaussee also paved the way for mixing Javanese and other ethnic
groups in other KNIL units from 1910.
38 But despite their success, the Dutch
continued to favour ‘martial races’ from minority populations. They especially
favoured Christian converts such as the Timorese, Menadonese (from northern
Sulawesi) and Ambonese. The latter came from islands forming part of the
Moluccas in the east of the Indonesian archipelago, and in particular from the
small spice island of Ambon, which had been subjugated by the East India
Company in the seventeenth century. ‘Ambonese’ recruits in fact came not just
from the island of Ambon, but from surrounding islands as well.
39 ‘Ambonese’
numbers continued to expand, from 733 in 1871 to more than 5000 in 1911,
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and slightly more than 10,000 in 1918. As a percentage, ‘Ambonese’ were about
7 per cent of the local, non-European component of forces in 1861, 16 per cent
in 1901 and nearly 30 per cent by 1918.
40 Debates raged in the 1910s and 1920s
on the martial qualities of different groups, and the best way to combine them.
In theory the resulting decision was to equalise pay, though in practice Ambonese
maintained higher pay as ‘ﬁrst class’ rather than ‘second class’ soldiers, and most
ofﬁcers expressed a preference for them as late as 1935.
41
It becomes clear, then, that recruitment of ethnic minority soldiers intensiﬁed
with the Dutch expansion of direct territorial rule in the second half of the
nineteenth century, when Bali, Lombok, northern Sumatra and other areas
were brought under increased Dutch control. Yet despite the wide casting of
the net in favour of ‘Ambonese’, and of non-Javanese in general, and despite
ambivalence about majority Javanese, the demands of expanding direct rule
meant that the biggest manpower pool, the Javanese, could not be ignored. By
1905 Ricklefs has ‘Javanese’ comprising 68 per cent of the Indonesian troops.
The ‘Ambonese’, whose Moluccan islands provided a tiny recruiting pool, had
now risen to 21 per cent of the total.
42 They continued to provide a vital source
of reliable NCOs, but could never be the mainstay for colonial forces.
43 A more
sophisticated breakdown of numbers reveals that the Dutch KNIL used several
groups, in addition to Europeans and Ambonese, to continue to counterbalance
the Javanese majority. By 1937 the ‘Indonesian’ component of the KNIL in-
cluded 12,700 Javanese, 5100 Menadonese, 4000 Ambonese, 1800 Sundanese,
1100 Timorese and 400 assorted others.
44
The Dutch thus remained ambivalent towards soldiers from the nominally
Muslim Javanese population. In this respect imperial preference struggled against
demographic reality. Twice, in the First World War and in the 1930s, the Dutch
rejected local nationalist calls for the raising of a ‘native’ militia force.
By the late 1930s the colonial army had expanded again, by about a third, to
60,000 and counting, but the population of the Netherlands Indies had ex-
panded by a similar proportion. In addition, the 1920s had seen the growth of
Indonesian nationalism, and an abortive communist-inﬂuenced revolt in parts of
Java and Sumatra, in 1926–7. By 1939 Indonesia’s total population was nearly
70 million. Put another way, even with rising nationalism, the Dutch were ruling
their colony with a ratio of less than one soldier for every 1000 people. By
comparison, in 1930 the United Kingdom’s armed forces represented one mem-
ber of the armed forces for every 100 in the population.
45
In short, a small metropolitan Dutch population was long reliant on non-
Dutch Europeans – notably Germans and Belgians – to help make up the
‘European’ component’ of its forces. As it switched from indirect imperial
force (alliances with local chiefs and their men together with small numbers of
company troops) to direct methods, it tried to use minorities as ballast against
majority Javanese. But, despite improving Ambonese service conditions from the
mid-nineteenth century – with better pay, prestige and pensions – and despite
increasing recruitment efforts in the outer islands, the Dutch still found they had
to rely on the majority for the largest number of recruits. The limited recruiting
CAIC02 10/10/05, 10:13 AM 5758 Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig
pool for minorities (at one point it was observed that too much recruitment
endangered the Ambonese economy) and the problems of moving minority sol-
diers across an archipelago stretching more than 3600 kilometres from Aceh in
Sumatra to the Moluccas in the east saw to that.
The Dutch did brieﬂy experiment with using West Ashante troops from Africa
in the 1840s (around 2100 being used in the period 1837–42), but ended this
after mutinies, and after British complaints that the Ashante king had been
selling his slaves for enlistment. There simply was not either a large metropolitan
pool or any other reservoir for imperial troops that might play a similar role to
British India.
46
What is notable here then is the small number of troops to population (40,000
in 1900 for 40 million colonial subjects, 60,000 in the 1930s for nearly 70
million), the relatively high ratio of Europeans to Indonesians at a third to almost
a half, the gap between fact and fantasy as regards preferences for ‘martial’ races
and the way ambivalence towards majority populations prevented their more
effective use.
The reliance on locally recruited ethnic minorities was even less practical for
the French in the early stages of their conquest of Indochina. In contrast to the
Dutch situation in 1800 – when conquests from the seventeenth century had
secured outposts in areas such as the Moluccas and Celebes/Sulawesi – the
French had not previously controlled any part of Vietnam, despite French mis-
sionaries having converted entire villages from the seventeenth century. Perhaps
more crucially, ethnic Vietnamese (or kinh) made up the large majority of those
lowlands populations that ﬁrst came under French control. The people in the
periphery, in particular the mountains, would only come under direct French
rule at a later stage.
The French, initially together with a Spanish force from Manila that included
Filipino soldiers, occupied the main southern port of Saigon in 1859. This fol-
lowed attacks on missionaries and Catholics, and was accompanied by dreams of
securing a staging post for trade with China. The Vietnamese Emperor, with his
capital at Hue in the country’s centre, ceded the six southern provinces around
Saigon in two phases, in 1862 and 1867. These then constituted the Colony of
Cochinchina, which contained fewer than three million people.
47 France also
made sparsely populated Cambodia a protectorate in 1863, against a back-
ground of Siamese and Vietnamese pressure on that territory. Central Vietnam
(Annam) and the more heavily populated north (Tonkin) were made into protec-
torates in 1883–5, though not fully paciﬁed until 1897.
48 Together the four
territories of Cochinchina, Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin were formed into the
Union of Indochina in 1887 under the leadership of a governor-general. Laos
was added as a new protectorate in 1893.
To help to police these territories, a 1700 strong Vietnamese regiment of
tirailleurs (riﬂemen) was raised in 1879 in Cochinchina. Substantive expansion
came with the conquest of Tonkin and Annam in the 1880s, a brief war with
China in 1885 and the repression of a royalist guerrilla movement into the
1890s. Initially there was a complex pattern, with ‘natives’ being raised under
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four headings: civil guard or militiamen paid for by the protectorate; Tirailleurs
Tonkinois infantrymen of the ﬁrst three regiments paid for by the Navy (tradition-
ally responsible for overseas expansion); a fourth regiment of infantry paid by the
Ministry of War; and the Chasseurs Annamites paid out of the Vietnamese royal
treasury. This is excluding irregulars, such as coolies and village militia tempor-
arily constituted in disturbed areas.
This hodgepodge of forces was much simpliﬁed between 1886 and 1891,
ultimately into two main categories: colonial infantrymen and civil guards. By
the 1930s the Indochinese army component could boast some 31 battalions,
around 20 of them indigenous, and right up to 1939 there were just 30,000
troops (17,500 Indochinese and 12,500 Europeans), of whom nearly two-thirds
were in Tonkin and nearly one-third in Cochinchina. With just 23 million people
in French Indochina by 1939, this represents a higher ratio of troops to soldiers
than in the Netherlands Indies, at approximately one for every 750. The pro-
portion of European soldiers was broadly similar.
The high proportion of Europeans is partly explained by the lengthy paciﬁca-
tion of Tonkin up to 1897. Even thereafter, the hard-won Gallic peace was
occasionally disrupted by anti-French movements and agitation, including patri-
otic attempts to suborn garrisons, and the threat of unrest in volatile China
spilling over into Tonkin. From an early plan to poison the Hanoi garrison in
1908 and several attempts during the First World War when French troop
presence was at a minimum, violent Vietnamese anti-colonialism erupted again
in the Yen Bay mutiny of February 1930. The latter was an unsuccessful attempt
to spark a military rebellion on the model of China’s 1911 revolution. If Chinese
nationalists had helped to spark a revolt among the Chinese Army and end over
250 years of Manchu rule, the French had every reason to fear that Vietnamese
nationalists might eventually master the same trick. The Vietnam Quoc Dan
Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), modelled on the Chinese
Kuomintang, certainly tried at Yen Bay and several other garrisons. The army
and the militia forces ultimately stood ﬁrm, both then and in a subsequent,
harshly repressed communist-inﬂuenced peasant uprising of 1930–1 in central
Vietnam. The French subsequently drove the VNQDD and communists under-
ground, but the fears these events inspired continued to haunt the management
of colonial troops.
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It is scarcely surprising, in these circumstances, that the French concentrated
their troop deployment around potentially rebellious population centres, as well
as along frontiers. Around 1930, nearly two-thirds of a total of 30,000 troops
were stationed in Tonkin, along its border and around its main urban centres
with their larger European populations. Most of the remaining one-third were in
Cochinchina, mainly concentrated around Saigon.
The French also tried to increase recruitment from non-Vietnamese groups,
notably from the Highlands. But given their relatively small numbers the main
emphasis was on improving surveillance and control of Vietnamese troops. The
declaration of war in Europe, in 1939, then reversed French caution. A tripling of
forces by 1940 – a period that saw French defeat in Europe and the establishment
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there of the Vichy Republic in 1940 – saw the European component creep up to
14,500, while the Indochinese soared to 75,500.
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Even worse, the French were forced to tolerate Japanese military bases in the
country from 1940 to 1941, and were ﬁnally ousted by the Japanese coup de force
of 9 March 1945. This set the scene for the rise, in the mountainous north of
Tonkin, of the communist-led, anti-Japanese Viet Minh front. With a war-
induced famine killing up to two million of Tonkin’s eight million people in
1945, the French were soon faced with the prospect of having to mount a second
colonial invasion of the country, against armed resistance, and in the face of a
population that had witnessed humiliation of the French at the hands of the
Japanese.
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Meanwhile, Indochina’s army had been supplemented by a Civil Guard (vari-
ously called the Garde civile (in Cochinchina) or Garde indigène (in the protectorate
territories). The latter originated from the Police indigène and ‘native’ guards. The
Police indigène had been formed in 1863, under civil control, and tasked with
maintaining order after the army had paciﬁed areas. It was ﬁxed at about 300–
400 per province, as a kind of National Guard or armed police, whose members
were liable mainly for local service. Their duties included manning prisons,
guarding public buildings and supporting the civil power. It was rebranded
subsequent to a Cambodian revolt of 1885–6 (and the conquest of Tonkin),
which necessitated ﬁnding extra forces. The resulting Garde civile or Garde indigène
(one each for Cochinchina, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia and Laos) reached 4150
for Tonkin alone by 1886, and 8800 in 1891.
Thus expanded, the Civil Guard saw its duties increased to include action
against banditry and regional revolts. Conscription was introduced along the
lines of the pre-existing Vietnamese model, in the form of directing village heads
to provide a number of men for three-year periods of service. As with the Dutch,
however, the French struggled to secure the desired level of European ofﬁcers,
which in the 1890s was six per battalion of 345, and also faced the problem of
the low pay and prestige of the Garde compared to its European ofﬁcers.
The French also suffered from tensions over who should control military and
quasi-military operations. At worst this could disintegrate into standoffs in the
1880s, as neither Civil Guard nor army were sure whose responsibility an action
was. Was one dealing with mere bandits (the Civil Guard) or organised rebels
(the army)? Squabbles were alleviated in Tonkin by distinguishing between bor-
der areas requiring external defence and the Red River Delta from 1886 requir-
ing mainly civil guard. Then in 1891 Territoires Militaires were created in the
northern highland regions bordering China, giving the military unfettered
authority there. This meant the military could use its own intelligence forces,
raise auxiliaries in the form of partisans and dabble in politics in these areas as
required. In civilian-controlled areas, the civilians could use their Civil Guard to
try their hand at war. In effect ﬁefs were created to be dominated by either the
military or civil power. Both army and Civil Guard, meanwhile, could call upon
the support of local police, and the Linh Co, the latter being guards charged with
assisting local Mandarins and ofﬁcials.
52
CAIC02 10/10/05, 10:13 AM 60Demography and domination in Southeast Asia 61
Ultimately the biggest source of military–civilian tensions, the question of
authority, was resolved in 1891 by making the highest-ranking general in
French Indochina subordinate to the Governor-General. The decree that
appointed Jean-Louis de Lanessan as Governor-General also made him the
Superior Commander of the troops. Lanessan was made the sole correspondent
with France. French Indochina’s generals henceforth had to direct all cor-
respondence with the metropole through the ofﬁce of the Governor-General.
Ironically, during the 1939–45 period, a general and then an admiral were
chosen by Paris and then Vichy respectively to direct French Indochina through
the Second World War.
Indochina in turn must be seen as part of a wider French system of imperial
power. In 1900, Tonkinese tirailleurs were deployed in the punitive expedition
against the Boxers. Large-scale use abroad of Vietnamese soldiers, and labour-
ers, started midway through the First World War, when Paris was in dire need of
support. From late 1915, more than 80,000 Vietnamese were shipped to France,
about half as soldiers, the others as war labourers. Some served on the Western
Front, others in the Mediterranean theatre of war. After drastic postwar reduc-
tions, Vietnamese soldiers were again sent to Europe from 1922, though the
number overseas appears not to have exceeded 10,000 at any one time. This was
further decreased from the late 1920s, and especially in the 1930s after the Yen
Bay Mutiny.
Reasons for this reverse included their misuse as ‘lackeys’ of the French army
rather than proper training as infantry, and fear they were bringing metropoli-
tan ideals of liberty and racial equality back to Indochina. French Indochina
nevertheless remained a manpower pool. During the Second World War about
7000 Indochinese soldiers, mainly Vietnamese, served in France, despite France’s
rapid defeat. Vietnamese were also used in French concessions in China from
about 1925. Even after French defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954,
which ushered in the end of French involvement in Indochina, units made up
from men initially recruited there were deployed in Algeria until 1960.
The French, with fear of demographic eclipse by Germany, thus attempted to
utilise Indochina as a manpower reservoir for the metropolis, as well as for its
overseas interests in the Mediterranean and Asia. Again, ‘Southeast Asia’ has to
be seen as just one component of a bigger imperial system. The use of Indochinese
troops was, however, on a smaller scale than that for Africans, whose forces,
such as the distinctive Zouaves infantry from Algeria, had been used in the con-
quest of Tonkin. In French West Africa, where there was a tradition of Tirailleurs
Sénégelais, the conscription of a Force Noire began in 1912. In total, some 215,000
French colonial troops, mainly from North and West Africa, served in France in
the First World War. After 1918, French African soldiers served in the occupa-
tion of the Rhineland, and as far away as the Levant (less so in Indochina, as it
was found that the Vietnamese disliked black African soldiers).
53 In 1940, when
France sought an armistice from Germany, there were 80,000 African troops in
the French front line, and De Gaulle’s ‘Free French’ forces also built upon an
African base.
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The British were in a still stronger position. They possessed the unique advant-
age of having British India pay for a combination of upwards of 60,000 British
and 150,000 Indian troops during the late nineteenth century. This Indian Army
had its roots in the switch of the English East India Company, from the mid-
eighteenth century, from subcontracting recruitment to local Indian recruiters
who provided sepoys (soldiers) virtually on a contract basis under their own com-
manders, to gradually formalising an Indian sepoy army directly under British
ofﬁcers. The latter increasingly organised Indian troops along European lines,
with regular pay and training allowing better drill, loyalty and discipline. Its
utility as a reserve did not derive from hugely inﬂated numbers; the ratio of
Indian Army troops to population was not notably high. It came from its early
professionalism, its mobility when combined with British maritime power and its
sheer scale making the ﬁnding of forces of a few hundred or even a few thousand
for individual Southeast Asian interventions manageable.
This was helped by the limited scale of Britain’s Southeast Asian territories, in
comparison to India with its population of 318 million in 1941. Even at their
pre-1941 peak Southeast Asian territories under British protection had a com-
bined population of fewer than 23 million. These territories included Burma and
its 16 million people, the Straits Settlements Colony (Penang from 1786, Singa-
pore from 1819 and Malacca from 1824), British Borneo territories (the Brooke
dynasty in Sarawak from the 1840s, the British North Borneo Company in the
1880s and British protection over the Brunei Sultanate as well from that time)
and the Malay States.
British Indian forces did not need to be stationed in Southeast Asia in very
large numbers, by Indian standards, to do the job required. Admittedly, Burma
was gradually conquered (in three wars from 1824 to 1885) as a border territory
of India, and administered as an Indian province until 1937, with mainly Indian
soldiers in its army and frontier force until after that date. But elsewhere only the
tiniest garrisons of Indian and British troops were required, secure in the know-
ledge, not least the ‘native’ knowledge, that more could be rushed to the spot in
a crisis. The Malay aristocracy in Perak had the unpleasant experience of con-
ﬁrming this in 1874–5. In 1874 some of them, by the ‘Pangkor Engagement’,
promised to accept a British Resident to advise the Sultan, and ‘accept’ that
advice on all matters except custom and religion. When it turned out that British
‘advice’ extended to issues such as freeing ‘slaves’, revolt raged, a Resident was
murdered and Indian sepoys were rapidly brought to the Malay state to make
British advice persuasive. Subsequent British Residents to Malay States – the last
of nine states to hold out accepted an adviser in 1914 – could assume that the
need to heed their advice was understood, even if the reality was that London
was loath to spend money and blood without compelling reason.
It is difﬁcult to gauge the effect, but the prestige of an imperial system of
power such as the British, with its large manpower reserves, and the degree to
which it could make itself seem part of the furniture of an age were arguably
important weapons in themselves. While Malay Sultans and later Filipino nation-
alists might quickly learn that resistance, at least large-scale violent resistance by
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regular forces, was largely futile, Acehnese Muslim leaders learned the opposite:
that Dutch numbers were limited and Acehnese mountains and forests never-
ending. Besides, if Aceh had once been Mecca’s verandah in the east (as an early
Southeast Asian convert to Islam), it may have drawn spiritual strength from a
feeling of being part of its own bigger system, an international ummah or Islamic
community.
At the same time, the bigger imperial systems were particularly vulnerable
to signs that their prestige, and overall strength, might be declining. Hence
in February 1915, when British troops were reduced almost to nothing in
Singapore as part of a wartime concentration on Europe – and the German
cruiser squadron Emden ranged the nearby seas sinking British vessels and
shelling Penang – it seemed Britain’s power was not so omnipotent. This was the
moment the Indian Fifth Light Infantry battalion, fearing it might be sent to
ﬁght fellow Muslims in Turkey, chose to mutiny. The mutiny was put down by
a mishmash of army technical arms, volunteers and even Japanese sailors. But
the reverberations of Japan’s rise – with its defeat ﬁrst of China in 1894–5 and
then of Russia in 1904–5 – were to be felt much more profoundly, symbolised
by the remorseless rise of Japanese exports in the years between the world wars.
Most of all, as we shall see in Chapter 9 by Abu Talib, it was the explosion
of Japan’s imperial system of power into Southeast Asia that was radically to
reshape the contours of the region and its military forces.
This brings us to another imperial system, and another time, namely the early
1940s. As with the Ming Chinese and British expansions, Japan’s forward move-
ment into Southeast Asia came after decades of economic penetration, culminat-
ing in a wave of cheap textiles, bicycles, toys and chinaware in the 1920s and
1930s, as well as investment in mining, plantations and ﬁshing. Some poor
Malays welcomed the Japanese in 1941 and 1942, in expectation not so much of
racial liberation as of a further wave of cheap goods.
55 If Japanese traders could
sell undergarments at 15 cents versus competitors’ 25 cents, what could Japanese
imperialism do?
It is worth pausing here, in order to tabulate the dimensions of the Japanese
empire at its peak, if only to remind ourselves that Japan was also very much like
Britain and Ming China in another way, in that Southeast Asia was a spillover
from these great imperial powers’ core concerns in South and East Asia. Indeed,
even use of the term ‘Southeast Asia’ is, to a degree, anachronistic for a region
that was called other names by imperial powers for most of the time, namely:
‘East of Suez’ or the ‘Far East’ (Britain); the West or Nanyang, meaning ‘South
Seas’ (China); the Nanyo (South Seas) component of the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Order (Japan); or simply Indo-China for the lesser imperial power,
France.
The paradox of the Japanese imperial system’s impact upon Southeast Asia
was that it was both overwhelming and underwhelming. Its initial campaign
smashed Western imperialism between December 1941 and early 1942, showing
up the weaknesses of the Western system of imperial defence. Although usually
numerically inferior, the Japanese had a higher proportion of battle-proven troops
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Table 2.7 Southeast Asia and Japan’s wartime empire
Population Territory (km
2)
Japan 71,114,308 (1940)
Original colonies
Korea 22,899,000 (1940) 220,769
Taiwan 5,212,000 (1940) 35,961
Karafuto 332,000 (1940) 36,090
Kwantung territories 1,134,000 (1940) 3,461
Nanyd (Paciﬁc Islands) 113,000 (1940) 2,149
Total 29,690,000
Second tier territories
Manchukuo 43,234,000 (1940) 1,303,143
Occupied China 200,000,000–250,000,000 (estimate) ?
Total 243,234,000–293,234,000
Southeast Asia
Borneo 783,000 (1939) 32,258
Dutch East Indies 69,435,000 (1939) 1,904,346
Burma 16,119,000 (1939) 605,000
Philippines 16,356,000 (1940) 296,295
French Indochina 23,500,000 (1938) 740,400
Timor 461,000 7,330
Thailand 14,464,000 (1937) 513,447
Malaya (including 5,333,000 132,027
the Straits Settlements
of Penang, Melaka
and Singapore)
Total 146,451,000
Source: adapted from Peter Duus, ‘Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues’, in Peter Duus,
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996), p. xiii.
from earlier campaigns in China. The Western colonial troops, ethnically plural,
often badly commanded and ill-prepared and ill-equipped for modern warfare
as opposed to colonial policing, were no match. The metropolitan countries,
moreover, were too preoccupied with their own survival – France and the
Netherlands were already occupied by the Germans – to be able to support
far-away dependencies adequately.
The Japanese overran all of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand
and French Indochina, which both obtained status as subordinate allies, in a matter
of months. But then they had to wrestle with the question of how to rationalise
and administer this new imperial layer. Here was a region that had, in essence,
been taken for reasons of economic security, to seize critical war resources that
Western embargoes were denying Japan from mid-1941, and as a matter of
opportunism, as a response to Hitler’s invasion of the Netherlands and France.
The previous East Asian components of Japan’s empire had been relatively
easy to encompass within a pan-Asian logic, of Japan helping similar Asian
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societies as an older brother. Japan had announced a ‘New Order in East Asia’
in November 1938, based on ‘mutual cooperation’ between ‘independent’ East
Asian states, which shared a writing system, physical characteristics and similarit-
ies in philosophical and religious traditions. Southeast Asia embraced greater
cultural variety, and so presented a greater challenge. Fortunately, Japan was
already developing an ideological basis for broader dominion.
In August 1940 Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke had expounded his vision
of a new ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. Now pan-Asian themes of
cultural commonality were downgraded, in favour of an image of Asian security
and especially economic cooperation under Japanese leadership. Japan’s new
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu further told the Diet in October 1943 that the war
was ‘a war of racial awakening – a war for the renascence of East Asia . . . a war
of national liberation’. The turning tide of the war from 1943, of course, sent
Japanese merchant ships to the ocean ﬂoor, and turned their aspirations for an
economic bloc into a hungry, poorly clad, inﬂation and black market-ridden
shambles.
56 For many, rice substitution meant that the co-prosperity sphere soon
turned into a tapioca empire.
Having swept the Western powers away in a matter of weeks, Japan thus tried
to retain the area’s raw materials, especially Sumatra and Burma’s petroleum,
with minimal garrisons. This was because Southeast Asia remained (notwith-
standing its resources) essentially peripheral to Japan’s metropolitan core, to its
ﬁrst ring of colonies in Taiwan and Korea (which together provided 200,000
troops integrated into Japanese units) and also to its second ring of expansion in
Manchuria and China. Indeed, one area this book shows up as in need of serious
attention is the overall Japanese approach to imperial security, with the differ-
ent approaches between these three rings. There was direct Nipponisation and
recruitment in the ﬁrst ring, a combination of full-scale military aggression
and more indirect and informal methods of imperialism and alignments with
local and ‘puppet’ regimes in the second, and maritime empire and inﬂuence in
the third.
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As Japan’s military overstretch led to a sinking maritime ﬂeet from 1943, and
an advancing American enemy into 1944, this meant two things for its third,
Southeast Asian, circle of empire. First, it meant increased space for left-wing led
anti-Japanese guerrilla forces to thrive, notably in Malaya and the Philippines,
thus leaving a legacy of armed, pro-communist groups in the postwar era. Second,
it meant Japan trained increasing numbers of Southeast Asians as auxiliary
labour, irregular troops and even regular forces such as the giyugun.
Abu Talib’s Chapter 9 in this volume how these Japanese-sponsored forces
came to play a vital part in accelerating and shaping postwar independence,
notably in Burma and Indonesia. In Burma this involved the Burma Defence
Army (its name and form changed several times). This peaked at tens of thou-
sands, changed sides to support the British by March 1945 and then under-
pinned the postwar pressure that accelerated independence to January 1948,
as opposed to British visions of a period of empire-bound reconstruction. In
Indonesia it involved training up to a million in youth groups, and smaller
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Table 2.8
Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere structure
Region
First circle
Taiwan, Korea
Second circle
(Manchukuo,
Nationalist
Government
in China)
Third circle
Burma, Indonesian
Outer Islands,
Philippines
Java, Malaya
Singapore
Ally
Thailand, French
Indochina (until the
March 1945 takeover)
a
General
a
 French Indochina was, until 9 March 1945, also an ally due to the Vichy
–Berlin–Tokyo axis.
Source: adapted from Peter Duus, 
‘Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues
’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 
The Japanese Wartime Empire,
1931–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. xxvi
–xxxii.
Ideology
Assimilation
Independence
Liberation
Declaratory parity
Economic structure
Economic development
(foodstuffs, semi-manufactured
and manufactured goods).
Economic development
(resource extraction,
semi-manufactured and
manufactured goods).
Resource extraction
Resource extraction
Trade, resource extraction
Political and security structure
Direct colonial administration, direct
recruitment into Japanese forces.
Nominally independent, actually a mix of 
‘indirect
’
and informal imperialism, with Japanese advisers
at various levels. Nominally independent security
forces, as well as Japanese Army presence.
Military administration (
Gunseikambu
) followed by
independence. Mix of small numbers of recruits
to Japanese-controlled armies, and large numbers
to Japanese-sponsored armies, militia and auxiliary
labour organisations.
Military government, no independence.
As above for military recruitment.
Military government, integral to Japanese system.
Independent, informal imperialism in the form of
high Japanese discretion in use for military purposes.
All categories except allies featured organisation down
to 
tonori gumi
 (neighbourhood associations), whose 
cho
(heads) were responsible for local behaviour.
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numbers in paramilitary organisations such as the Army of the Defenders of the
Homeland (Peta, 37,000 in Java and Bali alone, distributed in battalions around
these territories), Hizbollah (an Islamic paramilitary) and the more regular giyutai
(volunteer militia) and giyugun (volunteer army).
Where these Japanese-sponsored youth groups and forces were larger, as in
Indonesia and Burma, the results in terms of accelerating decolonisation seem to
have been more dramatic. Where the Japanese-sponsored armies and militias
were smaller in number, and nationalists given less leeway for propaganda, as in
Malaya, or there was greater continuity with prewar organisations as in the case
of the Philippine Constabulary, the postwar results of Japanese-sponsored forces
tended to be less dramatic and durable. In these areas the anti-Japanese armies,
mostly left-wing organisations relying on rural support, seem to have made a
more lasting impact. This included laying the groundwork for later insurgencies
in the Philippines (1946–51) and Malaya (1948–60).
Vietnam forms a separate category, in that the Japanese did not remove the
French administration until March 1945, by which point Japanese fortunes were
already in serious decline. Here it was as much French weakness as Japanese
intervention that enabled the Viet Minh to consolidate in the north, and so lay the
groundwork for postwar insurgency and war (1946–54 and 1959–75).
The Japanese period thus created a great variety of Japanese-sponsored and
anti-Japanese forces that could not be ignored. With Japanese surrender in
August 1945, the region headed towards a period of Western ‘decolonisation’.
Some might argue, as Geoffrey Robinson appears to imply in Chapter 11 with
regard to Indonesia and East Timor, that European decolonisation nevertheless
did not mean the end of imperial situations and of ‘colonial armies’. It could be
argued that imperial situations persist, and one might plot, for instance, the
changing demographic balance between Java and Indonesia’s outer islands. Given
the outer islands’ population growth in the twentieth century, and continuing
friction between the central government and areas such as Timor until 1999,
and Aceh afterwards, a case can be made for this. But that is another chapter,
and for another book.
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Much more could be said about the demographics of dominance, and about
the overlap between colonial forces and low intensity warfare. It could also be
argued that the colonial campaigns of the past provide a rich training manual for
the small conﬂicts of the present and the future. This can be seen, for instance, in
works on British frontier policing and on America’s small wars.
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The outline presented here will have to sufﬁce for now, as a sort of rough
mapping of the demographic terrain with which ‘imperial systems’, from Ming
China to the present day, have had to work when fashioning their military
presence in the region we now call Southeast Asia. Above all, this chapter sets
the scene for the rest of the book, by giving a satellite’s eye view of the geo-
graphical demography of Southeast Asia on the one hand, and the imperial
systems of power that sought to dominate Southeast Asians on the other. In so
doing, it makes the case for seeing not just individual pieces of the puzzle but the
puzzle as a whole, not just conquerors but the dominated, not just armies but
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navies and marines, and not just regulars but militias, and even the whole com-
plex of colonial and anti-colonial forces and discourses. In short, it makes the
case for contextualising the parts against wider imperial systems of power and
imagination.
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